Canada, as a country with a small, open economy, faces the immediate challenge of learning to shape dynamic comparative advantage in the emerging international economy. About 75 % of Canada's trade linkages are with the United States, and a very large component of the Canadian experience of « globalization » is driven by North American economic integration. This integration is taking place in the absence of institutions and policy mechanisms to promote and manage science, technology, and innovation relations on a continental scale. Bilateral s & T arrangements centered on the United States presently characterize the North American innovation System. Circumstances in North America pose three sets of challenges to Canadian s & T policy. 1) Science and technology are increasing in importance in international trade, environmental, and social/cultural matters. This means that Canada must learn to improve its management of an increasingly internationalized domestic s & T System. 2) Canada must cultivate mutually beneficial bilateral s & T relationships with its two partners in NAFTA, Mexico and the United States. 3) Canada must identify where its interests lie in the development and governance of trilateral and international rules and arrangements for science, technology, and innovation.
This article, which runs counter to traditional studies on non-proliferation, starts from the premise that it will be impossible to force the nuclear genie back into the lamp from whence he came. In the future, management of nuclear energy for military purposes will demand not a laisser-faire policy, as K. Waltz has stressed, but, at the very least, a constructive dialogue with the new candidates for membership in the nuclear club. It will be necessary, on this more cooperative basis, to redefine the rules of non-proliferation in favour of measures for regional stabilization and confidence-building. Only such a way forward will prevent the 21 st century from becoming the century of the nuclear mob.
This article begins by pointing out the discrepancy between, on the one hand, a certain political discourse which refers to a so-called New World Order in highly moralistic terms and, on the other hand, brute facts which attest to the contrary (resurgence of violent regional conflicts, atomization of global structures). It then examines the possibilities for analysing this discrepancy from a critical perspective centered on ethical norms. This leads the author to review the principal ethical approaches elaborated within the study of international relations since the Second World War. Emphasis is put on a major epistemological cleavage between academic disciplines, perhaps the most important demarcation in ethical theory : the one separating deontological from non-deontological theories. The systematic rejection or marginalization of deontology by the « discipline » of International Relations can be explained in terms of objective cognitive interests which have established, paradigmatically a genuine spirit of corporatism within the discipline. This article endeavors to explain such corporatism with a view to helping start a truly pluridisciplinary debate on ethics in the post-cold-war era
The precised calendar of Maastricht treaty for setting up the european System of central banks (ESCB) and the european central bank (ECB) with a single currency can merely be explained by the concern of the member countries of having such a monetary integration before the end of the century. There's every chance that ESCB be formed with limited number of countries, namely: France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands. If the objectives of price controls and non monetisation of debt assigned to ESCB are unequivocal, the responsability of fixing the parity of écu vis-à-vis third currencies which belongs to the Council and the Parliament might deprive the ESCB of full scope in conducting monetary policy. In regard to fiscal policies, the coexistence of budgets of various natures and the conjonctural stabilizations programs in prospect render difficult any computation on future coordination policy or federal budget. Finally, ecu once in place as a single currency could extend beyond the communities, but its acceptance on financial and commercial markets beside the dollar and the yen is scarcely predictable. This tendancy toward currencies zone, thus repeating history of the years thirties, does not constitute any guaranty for the stability of international monetary System which would require a kind of multilateral surveillance.