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Increasingly, one can observe the power of the state extending into the modem sector of Third World economies. Different types of cooperative relationships are established with multinational corporations, even to the point of excluding them altogether. A considerable part of the literature suggests that in this instance there is the formation of dependent capitalist societies, what could be referred to as state capitalism. Such a definition is contradictory and conceals the true operation of these societies. In fact, was are witnessing the emergence of a new type of production that the author refers to as bureaucratic development societies dominated by bureaucratically organized state classes. These state-classes collectively appropriate the social surplus and determine its allocation on a political basis allocating it either to consumption by the dominant class or to investment, but in this latter case, without consideration as to the immediate return on possible investments. The means by which such a class arrives at decisions are of particular interest because the author shows that they constitute both a hope and a threat for the broad-based development of the economies and the societies of the Third World.
Since 1956 normal diplomatic relations have been re-established between Japon and Soviet Union, but without any peace treaty. That situation is linked to the problem of the Southern Kuriles occupied by USSR since 1945 but claimed by Japon which took possession of these islands at the end of the I8th century - a state of affairs recognized by Russia in 1855. The Yalta conference attributed « the Kuriles » to USSR and the Son Francisco Treaty (which Moscow did not sign) stipulated their relinquishment by Japon. The latter has always considered that tins text could not apply to the Southern Kuriles. The Hatoyamo government however was ready in 1955 to renounce the two main islands, but the same year the formation of the liberal-democrat party was accompanied by a sudden change in the Japanese position. The 1956 modus vivendi avoided the territorial question and mode possible the development of economic relations between the two countries but the Southern Kuriles problem was revived by Tokyo in the wake of the 1969 agreement on Okinawa. One finds it since at all the turning points of the nippo-soviet relations in spite of the fact that the re-establisment of diplomatic sino-japanese relations in 1972 and the acceptation of the anti-hegemony clause by Tokyo in 1978 make more unlikely than ever a solution in favour of Japan. This one, however, maintains its claim for reasons where the national psychology plays a great part while political and, above all, strategic motives render practically unthinkable that USSR will ever comply. The problem will remain as a thorn in the relations between Tokyo and Moscow.
In the two electoral campaigns held in France in the spring of 1981, parties and their candidates gave only limited importance to foreign policy. They showed some interest during the presidential campaign but very little during the legislative elections. This relative silence can be explained by the fact that the French are in rather wide-spread agreement as to the over-all orientation of foreign policy as defined in the 1960s by General de Gaulle and as adapted subsequently by his successors. Clearly, economic and social questions dominated the electoral discussions.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing defended his seven-year record; his opponents in the outgoing majority and on the left sharply contested it. Without abandoning a critical position, François Mitterand tried to reassure the French by showing them that his coming to power would not upset the foundations of foreign policy and that changes would be more important in other areas. A thematic study of arguments used during the electoral campaign shows that Valery Giscard d'Estaing's opponents forcefully reproached his overall conception of foreign policy defined by "globalism" and his attitute toward the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan. The meeting between the French president and Leonid Brejnev in Warsaw was at the heart of the polemic. Even if weak arguments were used in other areas of foreign policy, international problems did in the end play a significant role in challenging the credibility of the outgoing president. Foreign policy became a tool used for electoral purposes.
The electoral campaign was characterized as well by the involvement of pressure groups, notably Jewish organizations discontent with French policy toward the Middle East and by the active support of the Socialist International in favor of François Mitterand. On the whole, the electoral campaign emphasized continuity more than change. It is useful to be aware of these positions in order to understand France s foreign activities under its socialist regime.
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the media has gone to great lengths to assess the relative capabilities of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. Chemical weapons have not been neglected in these assessments, with the conclusion usually being that something should be done to match the capability of the Warsaw Pact to wage chemical warfare. In fact, important decisions have recently been made in the United States, and others are being considered elsewhere, which reflect that point of view.
It is the position of this paper that the context within which chemical weapons have been considered in the past is too restrictive. Beginning with an examination of the role that chemical weapons are said to play in the East-West security framework, the article then goes on to a discussion of the global dimension of the issue. Finally, it outlines negociations underway to prohibit chemical weapons, and suggests that a regional approach to the problem might offer a way through the current impasse.
In the Southeast Asian area modalities of political dependence have developed which involve the distinctive typology of clients, silent partners, and proxies. These modalities govern the relationship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. They also are operative in the international interaction between the members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (Asean) and the Western major powers. A set of strategic cooperative arrangements, as well as direct military assistance between Asean, the Commonwealth and the U.S., has its counterpart in similar relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Hanoi dominated lndo-China alliance. As a result, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Southeast Asia is expressed politically and strategically primarily through the proxy relationships with the lndo-China states and key Asean members respectively. In turn, there are strong undercurrents in Asean seeking an accommodation with Hanoi, in order to minimize the conflict potential in the region generated by opposing U.S. and Soviet strategic interests. Particularly the relatively warming relationship between the U.S. and People's China has strengthened the Asean fears of China s long-term intentions in the region. An independent Vietnam, free from its proxy-client status toward the Soviet Union, could act as a buffer between China and the Southeast Asian region. Since Hanoi, if only for long-standing nationalistic reasons, wishes to be free from its currently necessary dependence on Moscow, Asean's accommodationist interests may well meet with appreciation in Hanoi in the future. This would tend to lessen the effect of the American-Soviet confrontation in the area.