There has been a tendency lately in the United States to talk about the breakdown of the domestic consensus on the purpose of American nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration policies have been largely responsible for the growing felt need by many to question the doctrine and plans underlining that strategy. Why did the erosion of the strategic consensus take place ? One explanation examined in this paper is that the U.S. government has appeared in its nuclear strategy to emphasize more and more counterforce and limited nuclear war plans as its nuclear weapons policy, and therefore has become increasingly receptive to the idea that atomic bombs can be treated like conventional weapons and thought in ways characteristic of the pronuclear world. The central purpose of this article is to analyze how those two phenomenons - the attractiveness of counterforce and the erosion of the strategic consensus - are related to one another. The evolution of the doctrine of counterforce is assessed through a survey of the literature from 1974 to 1984, and particularly from 1980 with the coming to power of the Reagan administration.
The debate on the advantages and disadvantages of free trade between Canada and the U.S. has intensified over the past months. Reluctance towards such an option in trading policy has increased and views differ more and more on the subject, particularly concerning its sector-based and regional consequences.
Following a survey of the findings of earlier economic studies, the consequences of free trade between Canada and the U.S. are assessed as regards job distribution in the manufacturing industry. Estimates are derived from studies made by Harris and Cox which allow comparison to be made between the consequences of bilateral and multilateral free trade s.
Contrary to the views expressed by the Royal Inquiry Commission, the results lead to the conclusion that bilateral free trade will bring about a marked relocation of the labour force. It turns out that job opportunity in areas with high level of employment would grow, as would the specialization of Quebec in these areas, as compared to Ontario.
Since the dawn of the 20th century, three ideologies have been constantly interacting in the Indonesian society, namely Islam, Marxism, and nationalism. Each has played a striking role in the evolution of the movement for independence - which led to independence in 1945. And today each of them wonders to what extent it has been responsible for the coup d'État by General Suharto in 1965. Since in the current situation, the relations which exist between these three trends of thought, in many respects, are reminiscent of those which prevailed during the interwar years, a study of that period may shed new light on an important moment of the history of political thought in Indonesia.
The question of relations between Islamic, nationalist, and Marxist thought is a prevalent issue in a country where a population of Muslim creed is held in subordination, and where there exist s an important leftist intellectual movement, with or without a significant working class.
Through the history of the anti-Dutch nationalist movements, through the rise of various Islamic movements (Pan-Islamism, the moderen, the "laity") and that of the Islamic parties linked to them (Sarekat Dagang Islam, Sarekat Islam), through the expansion of the social-democratic, socialist and communist parties (ISDU - Indian Social Democratic Union ; PKI - Perserikaten Kommunist de India ; Sarekat Rakjat - People's Association), and finally, through Sukarno's efforts to conciliate all these movements with a view to independence, an attempt is made to show that, in the evolution of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, there are two inherent elements, namely the socialist ideology and Islam. In the light of the case of Indonesia, it is therefore tempting to consider religion and politics as being symbiotic ideologies.
A few authors, while comparing the foreign policy of the Shah with that of khomeiny, have come to the conclusion either of a "total break" or, conversely, of a "continuity" with regard to the policy of Iran towards the Soviet Union. However, keeping only the Soviet Union in mind, but viewed from various levels in time and space, one can observe a break which derives from ideological incompatibility, then again a continuity which result s from some kind of realization of internal or external pressures. The fear arising from a threatening contiguity, the diplomatic isolation which followed the seizing of power in 1979, the pressure of political forces favourable to the USSR, the Kurdish minority in search of external allies, especially from the north, the ruinous war with Irak, the geopolitical constraints are such that the fundamentalists have not followed through their hostility to the end, in spite of its being fed by a series of historical resentments. The attitude of Iran towards the USSR still remains a real stake in its internal policy. The revolutionary turmoil has brought about a less blurred image of the USSR despite some confusion, an image once varied, then becoming apparently unified. The course of relations between Iran and the USSR depends to a great extent on the internal dynamics of the Iranian revolution, but also on the political evolution in the Middle East and on the new power struggle which could come about in that region.