The events of 9/11 have forced upon the entire community of Western states a re-assessment of their respective anti-terrorism policies and laws. It released an intense discussion seeking to update and re-characterize the post-9/11 state of international relations producing a wave of renewed attempts to legally (re)define terrorism. The main challenge is to determine whether terrorism in its twenty-first century manifestation warrants recognition as a component within the doctrine of armed conflict and what would be the effects of such transformation. This article compares how the judiciary in Western liberal and pluralist democracies has been tackling this dilemma and affecting respective legislative responses. The article offers preliminary thoughts as guidelines to the design of parameters for an approach to anti-terrorism security that is common to North America (and the rest of the world). To this effect, it contextualizes the relevant North American jurisprudential developments within a sample of other Western-oriented judicial track records. The article finds that the North American dialogue (in Canada and the US) among the three branches of government is departing from two opposite ends of one and the same Western War on Terror adjudicative spectrum. This context appears to be slowly, but eventually, progressing toward conversion, effecting a common re-characterization and definition of terrorism, anti-terrorism, and their place within the doctrine of armed conflict.
This study on war crises offers an operational index of complexity and spells out four postulates relating issue and structure elements to war outcomes. We expect that wars over territorial issues will end in an accommodative manner (postulate 1); that ethnic wars, though rare, will end in a non-accommodative outcome (postulate 2); and that clash of civilization issues, more than all other issues, will end in a non-accommodative way (postulate 3). Finally, wars with overall low complexity will end in accommodation while high complexity wars will not (postulate 4). Using ICB data, this study of 55 war crises, from 1946 to 2002, compares two situations: Intra-War Crisis (IWC), namely, long ongoing wars that are waged before the crisis begins (17 cases) and regular wars that occur after the crisis starts (38 cases). Findings from the study indicate that not all wars are alike. The substance of issues involved in the confrontation matters and complexity affects accommodation. Overall complexity is coupled, in part, with outcomes and, as anticipated, patterns of regular wars and IWCs vary. These findings on war diversity highlight the need for a comprehensive ‘multi path’ model to war.
Failed states are usually defined as those that are unable effectively to control their territory and comply with their international obligations. As such, they often pose a threat to their own populations and to international security. Failed states are of increased concern to Canadians, both because of the new UN doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect," and because their threat to international security has been increased by the effects of global integration. In addition, the very process of globalization, coupled with the effects of climate change, may cause their numbers to grow. The cost of resuscitating a failed state, however, is so considerable that, where we can prevent them from occurring, we should do so. The difficulties faced by the United States in Iraq and by the international community in Afghanistan, should not obscure the fact that since the end of the Cold War the world has been largely successful in reducing the number of armed conflicts arising from state failure. Since the problem of failed states may get worse, and in any case is not going away, we likely cannot lessen, and may have to increase our efforts to respond to the threats they pose. To do so adequately, however, will require governments to maintain public support for such missions. The growing public dissatisfaction with Canadian intervention in Afghanistan makes it clear how difficult this can be. A key factor in keeping public backing would be to agree to take part in peace-building missions only under appropriate conditions, following a debate in parliament.
In this article I make three main arguments. First, failing and failed states must be understood from a two-level game perspective. Their domestic conditions shape their international behavior, and their international circumstances exacerbate their internal failings. Second, established states and failing/failed states engage in different functions. Established states are focused on state expansion activities, while failing and failed states are attempting to undergo the process of state-building. Finally, I argue that this problem of failing states is not going away; more to the point, a collision course between these two types of states is inevitable.
This article on the Canadian mission in Somalia takes a contrarian approach to the conventional wisdom, which – focusing on the torture and murder of a Somali civilian – holds that the Canadian effort was a disaster. It points out that in the Somalia operation one can see the genesis of the "3D" (Defence, Development, Diplomacy) approach which now so clearly defines the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces first worked to establish security, then encouraged Somalis to embrace the peace-making process. The Canadians 'led from behind,' working with and encouraging local leaders to define community needs and projects. Finally, they engaged other Canadian government agencies to provide the development and reconstruction resources. However, I caution readers about the perils of drawing 'lessons' from the Somalia case, if only because one lesson that could be drawn easily would be to avoid such operations altogether and leave failed states to fester. The article argues that the application of the 3D approach in Afghanistan was simply a case of doing 'what works.' The real lesson of Somalia is that rescuing failed states requires patience – years, even decades, of commitment – and huge amounts of money, talented people, and political will.
This article examines the peace-building efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo to assess what has been accomplished and what international actors might have learned through the experience. Although in some sense the international operations in both cases have been profoundly successful — violence is absent, new governments have taken hold, and elections are considered free and fair — these successes are heavily qualified. Ethnic tensions remain high, local actors remain resistant to consensual modes of governance, and both places are considered relatively unstable. That is not surprising, as research shows that international peace-building is more successful at addressing immediate security needs than at building effective institutions. But the long tenure of these cases also makes them good candidates for examining the process of transition, to assess both its successes and its enduring challenges.
The relationship between the nation-building mission in Afghanistan and that country's connection with its influential neighbor Pakistan is very complex. The success of NATO's strategy to strengthen the new Kabul regime depends on its intersection with Pakistani policies. Pakistan's strategy in Afghanistan, in turn, is tied to its broader security policy against India. This is complicated by Afghan-Pakistan disputes over territory, Afghan refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the international border, Pakistan's interdiction of third party trade to and from Afghanistan, and a history of Afghan sponsorship of secessionism in Pakistan. All of these factors contribute to Pakistan's reluctance to contribute to the stabilization of Afghanistan by closing the insurgent sanctuaries in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. NATO has few non escalatory military options. It has two remaining venues of influence. First, its presence acts as a restraint on Afghan provocation of secessionism, thereby satisfying one of Islamabad's goals. Second, NATO could offer trade and aid incentives to Pakistan to gradually withdraw its support to those elements of its society that foment Pakhtun insurgency in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). The long-term effect of such a strategy would be a gradual economic integration and normalization of the Afghan and Pakistan frontier areas.