Documents found
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ABSTRACTR. Rorty daims that Wittgenstein agrees in the Philosophical Investigations with "antirepresentationalism " in that he rejects the distinction between representations toward which we should have a realist attitude and those toward which we should have the opposite, nonrealist, attitude. The aim of this paper is to show that this reading is incorrect. Wittgenstein accepts antirealist views in particular with respect to meaning and (at least) some mentalconcepts. The expression "the meaning of W", he holds, is not a referential expression (there is nothing which we may call "the meaning of W" in virtue of which "W" has that meaning). Expressions from our mental vocabulary such as "knowing the ABC" do not refer to internal states (like those studied by psychology or neurophysiology). "The meaning of W" and "knowing the ABC" are not expressions used to refer to or "talk about" anything.
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133.More information
Taking its point of departure from Johan Huizinga's definition and Roger Caillois' taxonomy of games, this article examines the relationship between games, fiction and narrative. The ludic dimension of fiction lies in its reliance on make-believe. Conversely, games involve a fictional dimension when the playfield represents a world, and when the actions of the player, instead of being regulated by abstract and conventional rules, mimic concrete actions leading to goals of genuine human interest. Caillois believed that fiction is incompatible with rules and competition, but his pronouncement is challenged by video games, as well as by the multiple narrativized versions of the “jeu de l'oie,” a standard board game. A true reconciliation of game and fictional story will however only take place when two conditions are fulfilled: 1. players are primarily motivated by the interest taken in the story; and 2. players construct the story through their actions, and every playing of the game produces a new story.
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AbstractI shall argue that though most theoreticians of social change firmly refuse normatively to endorse the natural selection of practices and individuals, they sometimes tacitly validate the consequences of such a conception of social change. More precisely, I shall argue that the formal apparatus still often used in social sciences — such as game theory, bargaining theory or decision theory — contribute to carrying on, at the normative level the social and individual aspects of natural selection. The argument rests on an analysis of what has come to be regarded the standard theory of utility and attempts to show that maximising rationality defined in that framework incorporates the requirement of the selection to those of rationality.
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SummaryAs part cif a research project on the use of persuasive discourse by seven-year-old children, a study was carried out in the areas of rhetoric, logic, psychology, philosophy of language and discourse analysis. This paper attempts to demonstrate how these difieren! areas, each dealing with its own particular field of study, nevertheless converge in a more or less avowed and recognized fashion on the analysis of the implicit elements of conversation, and indeed of the intentionality underlying verbal communication, which lies as the very heart of any analysis of persuasion.
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The teaching of orthography is complex and presents a number of specific difficulties. The number of concepts in this field is significant. Various teaching methods attempt to motivate the student to produce correct orthography; others provide various ways to teach rules of grammar. However, few have as an objective the acquisition of an efficient mental structure that could be generalizable to the rules governing grammatical orthography. A procedure to teach grammar that is based on an algorithmic approach could offer an acceptable way to solve problems related to the teaching of grammar.