Although the term "peacekeeping" still remains prominent in conceptual and academic circles, its potency as an immediate post-con flict policy instrument has ceased. So too has the effectiveness of a broad multilateral approach to peacekeeping eroded over the years, only to be replaced by more focused efforts to promote regional peacekeeping and bolster the capacity of the regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping operations. While much literature exists on the limitations of conventional UN peacekeeping and the broader operational roles peacekeepers are now expected to take on, far less has been written on the wider security and development policy that operational mechanisms like peacekeeping are now expected to support in most overseas interventions. Understanding the nature of this support is important for appreciating the new time horizons, new partners and new programs to which today's "peacekeepers" contribute. Key to this understanding is also the way in which bilateral and multilateral institutional structures have adapted to the "security-development" agenda and have responded in a more unified and strategic way. This article examines the persisting chal lenges that affect the traditional understanding of peacekeeping and the role of today's international peacekeeping forces. Secondly, it investigates the way in which broader security and development policy has evolved over the past decade, and describes the institutional changes that have emerged within bilateral and multilateral organizations. Lastly, it explores the legal, bureaucratic, and administrative hurdles that continue to challenge the era of "joined-up" government. Conclusions question whether or not, in such a state of organizational incoherence, international peacekeeping can survive as an effective policy instrument.
In the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, feminist activists have encouraged the use of international law to prosecute those leaders employing rape as a tool for ethnic cleansing. First, we will analyze the reasons that rape is effective in disrupting social and against women. Second, we will elucidate the peculiar problems of prosecuting war criminals whose offenses targeted female non-combatants in the form of sexual violence. We begin with an examination of the international law related to war crimes, as well as the ethical implications of various techniques used to enforce the law and bring war criminals to justice. A brief examination of key areas of US rape law will demonstrate the relative leniency extended to perpetrators of violence against women domestically in a nation that guarantees women full juridical equality. After examining some specific prosecutions, we will apply the lessons learned to the larger context of international law.
In many respects the current US situation in Iraq is one that resembles a colonial or neo-colonial policy. This involves forced entry by external great powers bent on reshaping the political system and taking command of the economic resources and their use. Although the initial conflict was international in nature, a persistent insurgency continues to challenge these efforts. The United States, nonetheless, continues to work toward a successful withdrawal from Iraq. This article explores the potential for successful exit. Using a case set of 17 extra-state wars for the period 1945-99, the authors explore factors of international support, exit agreements, and additional conflict variables in relation to exit outcome. Although a clear pattern of successful exit does not emerge, our findings sug gest that some of our assumptions regarding newly emerging states and external power withdrawal should perhaps be questioned.
This article discusses the role of third-party interventions in the failed peace process of Colombia that took place between 1998 and 2002. It analyses how both neutral and biased interventions impacted upon conflict dynamics. The article demonstrates that the neutral intervention was limited to the initiation of the peace talks and intermittent particularly in its final phase, while the biased intervention, led by the US, changed the incentive structure of the actors involved, creating hopes among the hard liners that the US could help them in winning the war. In hindsight, this biased intervention failed to tip the balance of power, but contributed to the derailment of the peace process. This article argues that third party intervention, particularly the biased intervention, failed to dismantle the war system. Instead, it has brought the Colombian war system into a phase of fluctuating stalemate, characterized by renewed volatility and violence.
Analysis of the connection between the narcotics economy and insurgent movements in Peru and Colombia shows that access by belligerents to the illicit economy greatly strengthens the insurgent movements. However, the belligerents' gains are not simply in the form of financial assets and enhanced military capabilities as frequently assumed, but are also in the form of expanded strategic and tactical options and, crucially, improved relations with local popu lations. Premised on the desire to reduce the physical capabilities of the belligerents, government attempts to defeat the insurgency through crop eradication not only fails to significantly reduce the belligerents' capabilities, but are also often counterproductive. Crop eradication only strengthens the bond between the belligerents and the local population, and deprives the government of vital intelligence on the belligerents.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian republics, which had not really sought independence, found themselves independent. Unlike what happened in some other parts of the former Soviet Union, the regimes in power under the Soviet Union remained in power, and endeavored through authoritarian means and trying to identify themselves with nascent nationalisms to suppress opposition and seek an aura of legitimacy. These regimes sought to suppress expressions of Islam and Islamic revivalism outside of state-sponsored Islam. Particularly in the aftermath of 11 September, it has been expedient for these regimes to label non-state-sponsored Islam as Wahhabi, even though most of this Islam has been of the more moderate indigenous Hanafi school. Progress in democratization has varied among the republics but has been slow in all of them. Until the overthrow of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, only Tajikistan, which had experienced a civil war, had changed leaders since independence. This article expresses concern that a focus on fighting terrorism may lead to a tendency to overlook issues of human rights and democratization in these states.